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THREE DAYS IN AUGUST: 
REFLECTIONS ON THE SOVIET COUP AND ITS CONSEQUENCES 
by Alan Geyer 
Dr. Alan Geyer (United Methodist) is professor of ecumenical theology at the Wesley 
Theological Seminary, Washington, DC. He is a former editor of the Christian 
Century and a prolific writer. He is the author of Christianity and the Superpowers 
(Nashville: Abingdon Press and Washington, DC: The Churches' Center for Theology 
and Public Policy, 1990). An article of his appeared in OPREE, Vol. X, No. 4. 
Surely the three days of August 19-21, 1991, and the runaway train events thereafter, 
must be reckoned one of the most extraordinary dramas of this century. If that much is a 
certainty, the burden of this paper is to suggest that not much else is certain to me. Every 
day in the weeks since being asked to write this paper, I have tried to reorganize my thoughts 
and start writing. But every day has bombarded us with a whole new array of stunning 
developments. 
I was in Moscow early this summer and stayed, for the umpteenth time, in the "Ukraina 
Hotel/' right there at the Kutuzov Prospekt's bridge over the Moscow River, just across from 
the Russian Federation White House. The week before the coup, I led a workshop on the 
USSR at Montreat, the main theme of which was "the razor's edge between freedom and 
chaos" in all Soviet institutions, but I was hardly preparing my hearers to expect the 
happenings of the very next week. 
Yet we have all known for several years, at least, that Soviet politics has been marked by 
severe turbulence. Mikhail Gorbachev's survival to date, even if it should end tomorrow, is 
one of the greatest political juggling acts of all time. Marshall Goldman, Russian studies 
professor at Harvard and Wellesley (no particular fan of Gorbachev) just last week expressed 
amazement at all that Gorbachev has produced since the coup. "Gorbachev," he said, "has 
more rabbits in his hat than Imelda Marcos has shoes." 
My own recent book in this field, Christianity and the Superpowers, published over a 
year ago but actually written two years ago, should have warned me to expect something like 
the shocks of August 19 and after. In my preface, I had written: "I have been made almost 
breathlessly aware of the daily ups and downs of the struggle for liberalization in the Soviet 
Union . . .  , as well as the contradictory prophecies of U.S. official and pundits. This is either 
a very bad or a very good time for such a book." In a chapter on Russian political history, 
I entertained the notion that "the new wave of de-Stalinization and de-Brezhnevization" 
might "sweep on to become de-Gorbachevization or even de-Leninization," and that "would 
surely leave the Russian Revolution without.its own icons." 
· Now I have been so ungracious as to quote myself, not to prove that I am a prophet (nor 
to promote sales of a book that really is not very much out of date), but to suggest that we 
have lived through such unendingly momentous events in Europe and the USSR, one after 
the other, or rather ten at a time, in the past three years that we keep being shocked anew, 
even though we have known all along that history itself has gotten unhinged in large areas 
of the world. 
The only honest way I know even to attempt any useful contribution to our reflections 
on these most recent events is to suggest a series of platitudes that may help keep us open 
both to fresh understandings of those days of August and to the surprises yet to come. 
My list of platitudes is sevenfold: 
I. The contingency of historical judgments 
2. The double-edged power of communications systems 
3. The precariousness of constitutional integrity 
4. The moral ambiguity of Russian nationalism (and all other nationalisms) 
S. The robust yet problematical resurgence of Russian Orthodoxy 
6. The perils of ideological triumphalism 
7. The residual Cold War in American politics and policies. 
I. The Contingency of Historical Judgments 
All of us are disposed to make our own assessments of the personalities, conflicts, and · 
consequences we have witnessed in these weeks, largely through TV lenses, but in some cases 
from personal presence amidst the turmoil or from private intelligence systems. A dominant 
image from the tube is the heroic figure· of Boris Yeltsin atop a tank and behind the 
barricades, rousing the youthful crowd in defiance of the coup and then a triumphant 
Yeltsin, proudly saying that Russia had saved the Union, the constitution, and the Union 
presidency. Yeltsin claimed to work in harness with Gorbachev, even while repeatedly 
seeking to humiliate Gorbachev. by sarcasm, while signing arbitrary decrees in Gorbachev's 
face,  and while accusating Gorbachev's culpability for betrayal by his closest aides. Whether 
the show of civility and even good humor that Yeltsin and Gorbachev displayed toward each 
other during ABC's midnight "town meeting" last week is a foretaste of future amicability, 
who can say, but it was certainly a prudent show on their part for an American audience 
just now. 
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Perhaps it is too much of an all-American game to remain obsessed with this question as 
to who won and who lost the coup and who is Number One now. I suspect, however, that 
the question really is significant after all, but it is too early to answer it with confidence. 
Challenging the mainstream of media reportage have been such Russian studies specialists as 
Stephen Cohen of Princeton and Jerry Hough of Duke and the Brookings Institution, both 
of whom continue to view Gorbachev as a very positive and empowering leader. Hough, not 
many days ago, forecast the reemergence of Gorbachev as a strong and indispensable 
president committed to constitutional legitimacy and civil liberties, while judging Yeltsin to 
be an intemperate opportunist of questionable democratic commitment. Other Yeltsin­
observers, acknowledging his past reputation as a populist demagogue without a coherent 
program or political philosophy and given to racist antipathies toward Soviet Asians, now 
claim that Yeltsin has greatly matured as a political leader and has surrounded himself with 
sagacious liberal advisors. 
Another prospective hold to which Gorbachev resorted, whether by design or not, were 
tactics of accommodation that continued to create time and space for the more aggressive 
reformers to form political organizations, master the media, wage campaigns, win elections -
- in short, to practice the more democratic political arts which were so long denied. From 
this perspective, extraordinary political transformations became possible just within the past 
year or two. Had the coup been waged a year or two ago, it might well have succeeded, 
given the fragility of democratic alternatives then. Boris Yeltsin, as the recently elected 
president of the Russian Federation, was in a much stronger position in August 1991 than 
he was in 1989 or even 1990. If Gorbachev now owes his political survival to Yeltsin (as well 
to his own courage), it is just as true that Yeltsin owes his own opportunities to the political 
reforms engineered by Gorbachev. 
In contrast with the very visible public drama of Yeltsin's bravery before the barricades, 
surrounded by legions of aides and fervent supporters, was the invisible private drama of 
Gorbachev's bravery at Foros in the Crimea. In defenseless and incommunicable isolation, 
he firmly resisted the coup and withstood its personal and family terrors. Upon return to 
Moscow, Gorbachev was visibly worn down and seemed caught in a time warp, only to 
receive much more abuse than sympathy for his ordeal. Yet he soon recovered his customary 
vigor, repeatedly confessed his own past judgments of both policies and personnel, gave up 
the party leadership that had been the summit of his whole career, and performed a 
remarkably effective mediating role among discordant republics and factions, fabricating an 
interim governmental edifice that may offer the only alternative to chaos. Thomas Naylor 
of Duke University, shortly after Gorbachev returned to Moscow, observed: "What truly 
differentiates Gorbachev from previous Soviet leaders is his sophisticated approach to 
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conflict. . . .  Time and time again he has transformed complex zero-sum conflicts into win­
win situations." 
On September 3, the president of Turkmenia treated the Congress of People's Deputies 
to a fable said to be well known among his compatriots. It provided one of the few merciful 
moments for Gorbachev since his lonely restoration. The fable tells of a khan who had been 
refused the support of one of three neighboring villages in his domain, even though he had 
courageously and repeatedly come back to the village and listened to the people's complaints 
and endured their violent assaults against him. They said: "We've thrown stones at you three 
times, you've tolerated it, you have the reserve, the patience, and the democratic way of 
presenting yourself." After that, the villagers stopped throwing stones at him. And the 
president of Turkmenia added: "We've thrown too many stones at Mikhail Sergeyevich." 
In truth, one of Gorbachev's most important roles has been to serve, and to endure, as 
a scapegoat for all of the discontents of all the peoples and factions of the USSR: the 
hardline Unionists and the impatient separatists, the Leninist remnants and the populist 
democrats, the privileged elites and the exasperated consumers. Boris Yeltsin has made 
especially good use of Gorbachev as a scapegoat. 
George Kennan, whom I revere above all other interpreters of Russian and Soviet 
matters, said that he was essentially finished as a strong leader. Kennan may be right, but 
I have been wondering in these subsequent weeks, as Gorby has ridden the tiger of a 
constantly changing power struggle, whether that judgment may have been premature. 
It remains true that both Gorbachev and Yeltsin, extraordinarily talented politicians 
apparently now in earnest about democratization, were, just a few years ago, major cogs in 
the Communist Party machine and its monopoly of power. What shall we say now about all 
these more sudden conversions of conservative top party leaders in the Ukraine (Leonid 
Kravchuk), Byelorussia, Azerbaijan, and other republic in the wake of the coup and the 
dismantling of the Communist Party? Their motives are at least suspect, as is their 
credibility as patrons of democracy. 
We can hardly know right now who most genuinely speaks for freedom and for justice 
in the Union of the Sovereign States. 
We can hardly know now whether democratic reform is irreversible and tyranny a thing 
of the past. 
There is a heavier question of historical judgement, looking backward to 1 9 1 7. How 
categorical a verdict shall we now make about the Russian Revolution? Was it all an 
unmitigated evil? Or can we still, with Nicholas Berdyaev, view the "militant godlessness" 
of the Communists as a response to the "historical sins" of Christianity, its official 
conservatism and its slavish subjection to the old regime? And imagine that wherever 
Communism captivated a people, at least for a time, the failure of churches and of Christians 
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to be faithful to their own prophetic Gospel culpable? Can we still be open to the evidence 
that millions of Soviet citizens, Christians and non-Christians, even under Demon Stalin, 
were inspired by a vision of social justice and humanization in a transformed society and, 
in fact, achieved some good thing? 
The contingency of historical judgments means an openness to both the future and to 
alternative readings of the past. That is such a broad platitude that all my other six 
platitudes may be comprehended by it, and may even be much more briefly explicated. 
2. The Double-edged Power of Communications Systems 
The addiction of many of us to the TV tube in recent weeks testifies not only to the 
power of that medium over us but also to its intrusiveness, even decisiveness, in a 
cataclysmic political event. We discovered again, as we had during the Gulf War, that not 
only mass publics around the world but the major governments involved were dependent on 
CNN and other broadcast media. 
Hardly less remarkable was the unobstructed flow of telephone and FAX 
communications, a yet-to-be explained lapse on the part of the coup leaders. Yeltsin could 
talk to Bush, Major, Mitterrand, and other world leaders, and TV and radio could broadcast 
that fact. Then, too, Gorbachev's makeshift radio helped overcome his total isolation, thanks 
to BBC and VOA. 
Still another benign effect of communications technology came from the US military's 
satellite monitoring of the Soviet military. When these national technical means discerned 
no extraordinary flow of Soviet communications or troop movements during the coup, US 
authorities could take an increasingly relaxed attitude toward the security implications of the 
coup. 
Communications systems, therefore, were determinative strategic assets for the coup's 
registers and their supporters around the world. Some caveats are in order, however, 
especially with regard to TV. Television has great power to obscure and distort historical 
perceptions. 
Television could not cover all the major actors: not the coup plotters, nor the divided 
military commanders, nor Gorbachev in his isolation, nor the leaders of most other republics 
(especially the Asian republics), nor the provincial and rural communities. 
TV's preoccupation with the immediate, visible, and sensational dramas tends to forfeit 
to others the interpretation of historical background and social analysis -- except for the 
hired commentators who, for fat fees, try to wrap up events in colorful packages of 
demonstrative expertise. While my own sampling was incomplete, I have the impression of 
a tedious procession of conservative and neo-conservative commentators who also tended 
toward a near-monopoly of the Op-Ed pages, of persons who had long majored in anti-
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Sovietism, who were quick to discount Gorbachev's achievements and/or his survivability, 
and to anoint Yeltsin as the Great Liberator: Zbigniew Brzezinski, Rowland Evans and 
" 
Robert Novak, Frank Gaffney, Marshall Goldman, Jim Hoagland, William Hyland, Jeane 
Kilpatrick, Henry Kissinger, Charles Krauthammer, A.M. Rosenthal, William Safire, Dimitri 
Simes, Helmut Sonnenfeldt, George Will. I must say that I have felt so often misled by most 
of these persons, most of the time, that I'm convinced we should look to others for more 
authentic expertise and wisdom. 
3. The Precariousness of Constitutional Integrity 
Whatever the limits of the media in helping us to form historical perspectives, the 
volatility of polity in the post-coup regime still presided over by Gorbachev should further 
deter our certitude. There is a discombobulating mishmash of an amended Soviet 
Constitution, a de facto coalition between Gorbachev and Yeltsin, a series of decrees, an 
interim government, a committee to design a new government, a growing fabric of bilateral 
accords between republics, an Inter-Republic Economic Committee, and a dissolved Congress 
of People's Deputies whose continuing self-importance has been fortified by the retention 
of their salaries, secretaries, and travel perks for three more years but without legislative 
authority. No doubt that list is an oversimplication. 
Gorbachev has cheerfully characterized this evolving polity as "a truly voluntary union, 
a federation on some issues, a confederation on others, an association on yet other questions." 
It has also been depicted as a "multitiered union," and again as a series of concentric circles 
moving out from a federal political core, to a confederal security state, to an economic 
community that may include the now liberated and independent Baltic states and perhaps 
other Eastern European countries. If this confounding of traditional notions of sovereignty 
succeeds, it would be unique in all the world. Richard N. Gardner, professor of international 
law at Columbia University and former assistant secretary state, is frankly baffled by the 
implications: "I must say, after teaching international law for 33 years, coming across this 
problem really baffles me . . . .  What is a state? I'm going back to the basic books to test this 
new thing that's emerging." Some day, but not now, we may better judge whether "this new 
thing" is only a desperate makeshift in the face of collapsing structures of authority or an 
imaginative model for a world whipsawed between global and ethnic pressures. 
The interim governmental structure approved last week by the Congress of People's 
Deputies includes these components: ( I )  an executive State Council, headed by Gorbachev, 
composed of the leaders of the republics, with primary responsibility for defense, foreign 
policy, law enforcement, and coordination of domestic affairs; (2) a bicameral Supreme 
Soviet composed of a Council of the Republics (twenty deputies from each republic except 
Russia, allotted fifty-two to reflect its autonomous districts and regions but each delegation 
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with only one vote) and a Council of the Union (deputies chosen by republic legislatures and 
enjoying the same apportionment as the dissolved Congress of People's Deputies); and (3) 
republic legislatures with the right to suspend within their borders any law adopted by the 
Supreme Soviet that contradicts their own constitutions. 
These designs reflect at least a provisional shift of power away from the center to the 
republics, most of whom have declared their independence in some form. How close these 
declarations will really approach a plentitude of sovereignty is not yet clear. Stephen Cohen 
believes that most of them were "actually ploys for negotiating union relationships, not steps 
toward disunion." The eventual strength of the residual union will likely be measured by the 
republics' confidence in Gorbachev and other union leaders, their security interests 
concerning neighboring republics and states, and their economic stakes in the union. The 
New York Times in a September 4 editorial proposed three tests for the survival of the union 
as an economic entity: the free flow of goods, tight currency controls, and protection of 
private contracts. 
There will be other severe tests of the constitutional integrity of the new regime. The 
prosecuting of personnel accused of treason in the coup must reach far enough but not too 
far, and it provides the opportunity for public spectacles of fair trials. A free press and an 
open political party system (even for Communists) would vindicate the democratic rhetoric 
of reformers. 
A particularly troublesome matter is the republics' treatment of their own minorities. 
There are 30 million non-Russians in the Russian Federation, while ethnic Russians are 
numerous in all the republics. There are more Russians than Kazakhs in Kazakhstan, more 
Russians than Ukrainians in the Ukrainian Crimea; nearly a third of the population of 
Moldavia is Russian or Ukrainian. The Russians and Ukrainians of Moldavia have declared 
independence for their own Dniester Republic. The Ossetians are seeking independence from 
Georgia, as in Nagorno-Karabakh from Azerbaijan. In all these cases, prospects of civil 
strife are serious, especially if civil rights are not secure. Border changes, a further 
proliferation and miniaturization of sovereignties, and mass displacements of population are 
all conceivable. 
There is one especially ironic possibility already in process. In 1 944, Stalin sought United 
Nations membership and votes for every one of the then-sixteen Soviet republics. At Yalta 
in 1 945, Roosevelt and Churchill agreed to bargain at the time. Now the disintegration of 
Stalin's Union may result in many of the UN votes Stalin sought but for republics with more 
legitimate claims to sovereignty. (Or has Stalin's ghost played this trick on the world?) 
Speaking of the UN, the Charter specifically designates the Union of Soviet Socialist 
Republics as a permanent member of the Security Council, with veto power. The name 
change will force a Charter amendment, but who will retain the veto power? And in this 
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amending process, will the pressures, already mounting for several years, for the German, 
Japanese, and perhaps Indian status as permanent members be rewarded? 
4. The Moral Ambiguity of Russian Nationalism (And All Other Nationalisms) 
The visible vanguard of resistance to the August coup came from Russian leaders who 
professed to be democratic reformers. Of their personal courage there can be no doubt. But 
the chauvinistic appeal to the Russian tricolor and the tsarist two-headed eagle was a 
reminder of the darker side of Russian nationalism which Boris Yeltsin has been slow to 
repudiate: strong currents of authoritarianism, even of Christian monarchism, anti-Semitism, 
racism, and a New Right paranoia about "Russophobia." Yeltsin's push for Russian 
leadership in most key posts in the Union Center, his peremptory decrees concerning all­
Union institutions; his bullying of Gorbachev, his hint of irredentism concerning Russian 
minorities in other republics, and his proposal that all Soviet nuclear weapons be confined 
to his own territory have stirred anxiety and resentment in non-Russian republics. 
Nationalism is a powerful motive force for liberation from external control. Its interior 
ethos is likely to be morally ambiguous. There remains an uncertain equation between 
freedom for the republics and freedom within the republics. Hardly any of the republics can 
draw on heritages of democratic values and institutional practice. The unknowable is 
whether the brief experience of glasnost has so fortified familiarity with liberty that the 
impulses toward repression, in the name of nationalism, will not prevail. 
5. The Robust yet Problematical Resurgence of Russian Orthodoxy 
We all know how much the dramatic convergence of glasnost with the 1 988 Millennium 
of Russian Christianity has increasingly liberated religion itself from Communist repression . 
. 
The Russian Orthodox Church has not only been engaged in opening and reopening 
thousands of churches and establishing new seminaries; it has been blessed (and burdened) 
with new opportunities for education, publishing, social services, hospital administration, 
and TV and radio ministries. Three months ago at Zagorsk, my participation in 
conversations with Patriarch Alexei II confirmed my impressions that he is a remarkable 
vigorous, knowledgeable, and articulate successor to Pimen, whose last years were devoid 
of strong leadership. Alexei, for example, spoke of his previous day's conversations with the 
rector of Moscow State University and their plans to integrate religious studies in higher 
education. Not long after, he blessed the inauguration of Yeltsin as Russian president, 
admonishing Boris Nikolayevich to follow the "law of Christ" in all things. 
Alexei had already become a very popular and esteemed hierarch before the coup. His 
forthright opposition to the coup in response to an appeal from Yeltsin has surely enhanced 




of the long suffering of the Church under Communism, was notable for his insistence that 
Christians, of all people, should not be seeking vengeance. Priests, including Gleb Yakunin, 
visibly ministered to troops at the barricades and distributed thousands of Bibles, almost all 
of which were accepted gladly. Yeltsin's testimony that he is now a frequent churchgoer, if 
not a creedal believer, and his proposal to return the Kremlin cathedrals to the Church, are 
bound to be heartening to Russian Christians. 
But there are some vexing questions beneath these hopeful developments. The new 
clericalism in Russian politics, parties, and parliaments will surely produce new tensions, as 
will religious studies in schools and universities. (These Russians may violate the 
establishment clause of the First Amendment to the US Constitution!) Orthodoxy is not a 
monolith, and the splintering of Orthodoxy itself along ethnic, ideological, and generational 
lines diminishes the moral authority of the Church. The renewed ascendancy of Orthodoxy 
could further the marginalization of Protestants and Catholics, although Alexei himself has 
been an irenic ecumenical leader, most demonstrably as president of CEC (the Conference 
of European Churches). Similarly, Orthodox resurgence could intensify hostility with Jews, 
Muslims, and Buddhists. 
Our prayer must be that the good news of Russian Christianity is greater than the bad 
news. I have never been quite sure that the good news of American Christianity is greater 
than the bad news. 
6. The Perils of Ideological Triumphalism 
Two summers ago, many pundits announced that the Cold War was over and that the US 
had won. To Francis Fukuyama, that presumed victory was eschatological: liberal 
democratic capitalism's victory over Soviet Communism had brought us to "the end of 
history." As if that were not enough of a boost to American triumphalism, the euphoria 
generated by "Operation Desert Storm" ushered in (we were told) a "new world order." 
Now the apparent final collapse of Soviet Communism after the coup� the dismantling 
of the Party and its organs, the toppling of the Party's icons, the purging of the KGB, the 
reversion of Leningrad to St. Petersburg, of Sverdlovsk to Ekaterinburg, and other wholesale 
name changes -- all tend to confirm capitalist Christian Americans in self-congratulations. 
Whether the new Union of Sovereign States can justly contain vengeful anticommunism 
as a vigilante force is now another serious test of its constitutional integrity. Blatant anti­
communism has been a pernicious force in Nazi Germany, Latin America, Southeast Asia, 
and the United States; it could well become so in the post-Soviet Union. 
Notwithstanding all the literature to the effect that socialist ideology had long been 
reduced to ritual rhetoric in the USSR (a proposition to which I have tended to subscribe), 
the coup revealed a residue of true believers. Gorbachev himself, unlike Yeltsin, honestly 
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continued to describe himself as a socialist and pointed to various European countries guided 
by such a program. Then there were nameless citizens in street interviews who confessed 
utter bewilderment at the loss of Leninism's and Communism's moral authority for their 
lives. 
As the statues of Lenin and other old Bolsheviks were toppling, I thought of the toppling 
pedestals of the US economy: the banks, the Savings and Loan Associations, the holding 
companies, the airlines, the commercial bankruptcies, and all this while more and more cities 
and states were approaching bankruptcy, urban infrastructures were deteriorating, the 
escalating costs of the medical-industrial complex were ravishing almost every other 
institution (including the churches), federal budget deficits were still uncontrolled, and the 
US was experiencing a double-dip recession. 
There is simply no credible case for ideological triumphalism in America right now. 
7. The Residual Cold War 
There is more than a little misdirection in the presumption that the Cold War is all over. 
Whatever the persisting suspicions of some communist hardliners like deposed KGB chief 
Vladimir Kryuchkov that the US had been deliberately fomenting the disintegration of the 
USSR, the US continues to maintain most of the military and institutional paraphernalia of 
the Cold War: the governmental security structures, overseas deployments, strategic weapons, 
defense industries, high level of arms exports, and the same $300 billion level of military 
expenditures of recent years. 
While Presidents Bush and Gorbachev signed the START (Strategic Arms Reduction) 
Treaty in Moscow in July, that 750-page opus is more political symbol than military 
substance. The parties have seven years to trim their arsenals to treaty limits. However, the 
US even then might retain as many as 10,000 strategic nuclear weapons, down from 12,000 -
- thanks to counting rules that exempt sea-launched cruise missiles, half the air-launched 
cruise missiles that can be carried by US bombers, attack missiles, gravity bombs, not to 
mention thousands of tactical nuclear arms. The START Treaty does not preclude any major 
US nuclear system -- not MX or Midgetman, or Trident, or B-2 bombers, or cruise missiles. 
Moreover, it does not restrict SDI "Star Wars" programs, except that Moscow reserves the 
right to withdraw from the treaty in the event of SDI tests or deployments in violation of the 
ABM Treaty of 1972. In fact, SDI has just gotten a fresh boost in Congress, based on a 
spurious citation of the performance of Patriot missiles against Iraq's Scuds in the Gulf War. 
Not many days ago, Secretary of Defense Cheney offered still another argument for SDI: the 
spectre of nuclear proliferation among separatist republics in the former Soviet Union. 
Similarly, the B-2 stealth bomber has a new lease on life on account of enthusiasm over the 
performance of F-117A stealth fighters against Iraq. 
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This endurance of Cold War arsenals after the rapprochements of recent years -- and 
even after the severely diminished superpower status of the former Soviet Union -- is 
depressing evidence of the great gap between military habits and political realities. Of 
course, more than the Washington-Moscow connection is at stake in this gap. The possibility 
of any kind of peach dividend, with all the domestic and international claims upon it, 
depends on closing the gap. All of which is to say that the churches and the erstwhile peace 
movement, for all their tendency to celebrate the end of the Cold War and now the defeat 
of the Soviet coup and to move on to other issues, must somehow and very soon get back into 
the public struggle over military and disarmament issues. 
There is, finally, a residual Cold War in the slowness of the Bush administration, for rigid 
ideological reasons, to commit itself to timely economic and food assistance to the hard­
pressed Union of Sovereign States. That, too, reveals a great gap between habit and political 
reality. The prospects for continuing democratization of the Union and for avoiding another 
reactionary coup with perhaps much more mass support out of desperation for authoritarian 
order, clearly depend on the viability of this fragile new regime in meeting the most basic 
human needs, especially in the long cold winter just ahead. Vaclav Havel has said that 
"instability, poverty, disaster and chaos" in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe could 
threaten the West just as much as the arms arsenals of former Communist governments. 
Surely the churches should speak to this reality, too--and very soon. 
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